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Does science have the final word? Could it ever have it? On October 2016, the School of 
Physical Education and Sports of the University of Costa Rica hosted Dr. René van Woudenberg, a 
philosopher of science from the Free University in Amsterdam. He addressed the audience on the 
presuppositions of science. In this issue of PENSAR EN MOVIMIENTO we have included both the English 
and Spanish versions of his manuscript, after it underwent a peer review process. I would like to seize 
the opportunity to share with our readers a related topic which is seldom discussed among human 
movement professionals, which is nevertheless fundamental for our scientific endeavors. At the same 
time, it should serve as an introduction to Dr. van Woudenberg’s manuscript. 
In this editorial I present a few introductory topics to the philosophy of science, namely, the 
nature of science, what are its limits, and if and how they should be managed. An attempt is also 
made to prepare a well-supported list of good scientific research practices. As a researcher who has 
done most of his work in health and human performance, my focus is on the natural sciences and, 
more specifically, on human movement science. 
Everywhere we look we see numerous health and fitness claims supposedly based on science. 
The fact that many of these claims contradict each other doesn't seem to bother most people, actually, 
for many, it is better that way, because each individual can conveniently find “scientific” support for his 
or her own practices and beliefs. This last element is crucial because science enjoys today a similar 
status in Western society as religion enjoyed in Europe in the middle ages: it is the final authority that 
you question at your own peril. I need to ask: just how reliable, how final, how all-encompassing 
(universally competent) is science as a source of knowledge and a guide for life? 
Most scientists agree that a simple theory or explanation is better than a complicated one. 
Although there seems to be no philosophically sound basis for this presupposition, it is necessary to 
start somewhere, so I will begin with the most simple view of science which—together with Chalmers  
(2013, Chapter 1)—I believe is also the most common: we live in a natural world where things are 
what they are and behave in a particular way; by using the scientific method, a wonderful development 
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that marked the end of the Middle Ages, we humans can collect facts to gain an objective 
understanding of our natural world and we can predict what will happen under specific conditions. 
Science has been extremely successful for the past few centuries, and temporary technical limitations 
alone (e.g. telescopic and microscopic magnifying capacity and image resolution; video sampling 
frequency; data storage and processing) have limited what can and cannot be answered by it. 
Anything worth studying should be studied scientifically; science should have the final word on 
everything. Again, this is a common view of science shared by a large number of people. 
Science has indeed been extremely successful, but it turns out that things are slightly more 
complicated than stated in the previous paragraph, or at least that is what philosophers of science 
want us practicing scientists to believe. Unfortunately for us, they make a rather strong case. There is 
no clear-cut definition that enables intellectually honest humans to distinguish science from 
nonscience, even after major attempts have been made to get there (cf. Moreland, 1989, chapter 1). 
The scientific method, as a clearly defined series of steps from initial questions to theory development, 
does not exist. There is no possible way for science to claim that truth has been arrived at, no way to 
absolutely prove anything. And apparently science cannot even make a solid case for its own 
credibility without borrowing from other disciplines such as philosophy! In the pages that follow, I will 
make an attempt at discussing some of those problems and recommending a few good scientific 
research practices. 
Is all knowledge suspect? How about non-scientific knowledge? Is there such a thing as 
objective truth, or are there multiple ways of understanding the natural world, all equally valid as long 
as they make one happy and keep the world running? I bring my own presuppositions into these 
questions: first of all, I believe that it is not possible to deal with any rational discussions without first 
admitting that we all bring some presuppositions to the table—science certainly does (cf. Moreland, 
1989). I believe that there is a natural world that does behave in predictable ways, and that human 
beings have the ability to perceive that natural world and understand it. With many of the seventeenth 
century scientists, and many of the current ones, I believe that the natural world was created by a 
rational, personal being who endowed it with many of his own characteristics: order, rationality, 
consistency, beauty, and truth. And I believe that science is one broad discipline which can tell us a 
great deal about our natural world, but it is not the only one that can give us important, reliable 
knowledge, and it cannot do so in total isolation from other disciplines. Furthermore, honest answers 
to the most important questions in life are beyond the bounds of science (Lennox, 2009; Medawar, 
1984). 
Because science cannot study the natural world in isolation from other disciplines, I will start 
from a perspective that science must be illuminated by philosophy. In a quote from John Kekes (Kekes, 
1980, Nature of philosophy, pp. 156-157), Moreland presents a list of important philosophical 
presuppositions of science: 
Science is committed to several presuppositions: that nature exists, that it has 
discoverable order, that it is uniform, are existential presuppositions of science; the 
distinctions between space and time, cause and effect, the observer and the observed, 
real and apparent, orderly and chaotic, are classificatory presuppositions; while 
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intersubjective testability, quantifiability, the public availability of data, are 
methodological presuppositions; some axiological presuppositions are the honest 
reporting of results, the worthwhileness of getting the facts right, and scrupulousness in 
avoiding observational or experimental error. If any one of these presuppositions were 
abandoned, science, as we know it, could not be done. Yet the acceptance of the 
presuppositions cannot be a matter of course, for each has been challenged and 
alternatives are readily available (Moreland, 1989, p. 109). 
 
A major characteristic of science seems to be that because it is practiced or done by human 
beings, it is not possible to eliminate all possible sources of bias, however shocking that may sound to 
the naïve scientist. For the positivists and empiricists, it would be ideal if we were able to collect facts 
free from the constraints of any theories, but this has been shown not to be possible (Chalmers, 2013, 
Ratzsch, 2000). There is a need for presuppositions, for existing knowledge, to guide our fact-
collection efforts in a productive way. Theories are often implicit in the way we measure phenomena, 
in the choice of measuring instruments, or in our selection of phenomena to be measured. In short, it 
seems that it is not possible for a scientist to do science independently from his/her own interests and 
perspective. Not only closely related theories, but even each scientist's worldview will have an impact 
on his or her science. 
According to Ratzsch (2000), this human ingredient of science was somewhat recently rescued 
by Thomas Kuhn: more than an undesirable but unavoidable element, the application of human values 
is seen as fundamental to the practice of science. Ratzsch's position is that “contemporary philosophy 
of science has been searching for some middle ground where reason, observation and objectivity 
have an appropriate place but where the human factor is at least that—a factor.” (Ratzsch, 2000, 
Chapter 3, last paragraph). 
Now do we, as scientists, search for truth, or do we simply try to find a reasonably good 
explanation? Plato was cautious on this topic, stating in his Timaeus “...if we can come up with 
accounts no less likely than any, we ought to be content, keeping in mind that both I, the speaker, and 
you, the judges, are only human (…) It behooves us not to look for anything beyond this.” (McGrew, 
Alspector-Kelly, and Allhoff, 2009, p. 27). Apparently, the balance had soon shifted to the side of 
certainty, as stated by Aristotle in his Posterior Analytics. But it swung back again later on: “One 
critical philosophical development accompanying the scientific revolution was the shift from the 
Aristotelian conception of science as absolutely certain knowledge derived from first principles to a 
more modest conception of science as a rational but fallible discipline.” (McGrew et al., 2009, p. 9). 
Moses Maimonides expressed a curiously practical view of truth and science in his Guide of the 
Perplexed, stating that the purpose of the astronomer “is not to tell us in which way the spheres truly 
are, but to posit an astronomical system in which it would be possible for the motions to be circular 
and uniform and to correspond to what is apprehended through sight, regardless of whether or not 
things are thus in fact.” (McGrew et al., 2009, p. 84). In other words, it doesn't matter if the model is 
not true, as long as it fits with observed data. That seems to be the view of many contemporary 
scientists, who practice a pragmatic instrumentalism even if they don't expressly subscribe to it. I beg 
to disagree with this position. I concur that science is unable to give us proof that truth has been 
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reached (“Experimental science offers the proof not of the logician but of the lawyer.” (Decaen, 2012, 
p. 26), but I am convinced that truth exists and that we should use our minds to try to grasp it, even if 
our efforts are like Medawar's asymptote, “for there can be no apodictic certainty in science, no finally 
conclusive certainty beyond the reach of criticism.” (Medawar, 1985, p. 5). We would like to believe 
that science is making theoretical progress over time and that progress means getting closer to the 
truth. 
The meaning and relevance of truth is only one of many sources of disagreement among 
philosophers of science, and the details are far beyond the scope of this paper—and much further 
beyond the expertise of its author. However, from the limited reading I have been able to do in such a 
vast area, it is apparent that most—if not all—philosophies of science agree on several important 
points, such as the impossibility to know when truth has been reached mentioned in the previous 
paragraph. The conviction exists that there should be a constant striving for objectivity, rationality, and 
empiricality. There is a generalized and necessary belief in the uniformity of nature (van Woudenberg, 
2017). And regardless of one's perspective, no philosophy of science can account for each and every 
case of what has actually happened in the rich history of scientific discovery. 
To conclude this section I must add that the mere fact that there is so much debate among 
different philosophies of science reflects that science is far from perfect and unable to point us in the 
right direction by itself. Science is limited, even if some scientists don’t act as if it were. 
 
The Limits of Science 
Even the study of the limits of science is considerably more complicated than one might suppose. 
In addition to the limits I intend to present more in depth, namely, whether there are areas where 
science simply cannot provide an answer—Sir Peter Medawar (1984) calls them the first and last 
things—there are others. Some limits have to do with the self-limitation of growth, with technological 
capacity or with cognitive inadequacy, and in this line Medawar states that “there is no limit upon the 
ability of science to answer the kind of questions that science can answer” (Medawar, 1984, p.86; the 
quote sounds unfortunately circular, but the context shows that he meant that all questions within the 
domain of science can be answered and will be answered sooner or later). Some practical limits are 
due to economic, social, or environmental resources, even if some of those limits can be adjusted by 
policy. Other practical, external limits have to do with experiments or procedures that science should 
not embark upon for ethical reasons, a vast and controversial area (here, too, the line is far from set 
on stone). For the remainder of this paper, I will attempt to focus only on what science, because of its 
nature, can and cannot tell us about our world. My list, of course, will not be exhaustive regarding the 
former (an impossible task) or even the latter. 
Perhaps the most important limit to science is that it cannot make a case for its own credibility, 
as stated previously, nor for ruling out other legitimate, rational disciplines like philosophy or theology.  
Declaring that only science can lead to truth cannot be deducted from science itself, it is a self-refuting 
statement (Lennox, 2009). So is the claim that “only what can be known by science or quantified and 
tested empirically is true and rational” (Moreland, 1989, p. 107). The point is that there are many 
cases in which science is not our source of information, and that does not mean that reason is no 
longer working and that evidence is no longer relevant (Lennox, 2009); science does not have the 
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monopoly of rational knowledge. 
 Science, because of its very nature, does not cover all types of rational knowledge. Van 
Woudenberg (2008) presents examples of what he calls irreducibly extra-scientific knowledge, facts 
that I know but science played no role in allowing me to know, and cannot even allow me to know, 
such as my knowledge that lying is wrong, or that I have an obligation to care for my children and my 
aging parents. The warrant condition for this type of knowledge cannot be satisfied by anything 
scientific. The study of questions that lie outside science, such as, what is a moral virtue? How do we 
obtain moral knowledge? is important because, as Moreland wrote, “our culture is so inundated with 
scientism—roughly, the view that only what science says is true or rational is, in fact, true or rational—
and there has been such a pragmatic emphasis on science in education (…) that there is a 
widespread cultural myth that questions like those above are mere matters of private opinion.” 
(Moreland, 1989, p. 46). In this sense, a limit to science would be “an explanation or answer to some 
problem that properly lies outside the boundaries of scientific explanation and is cognitive in nature, 
that is, it is in principle a rational issue whose solution can be true or approximately true.” (Moreland, 
1989, p. 105). Or in van Woudenberg's words, science is limited by irreducibly extra-scientific 
knowledge, those true beliefs that are warranted but whose warrant condition cannot come from 
science. 
This limit cannot be stressed enough: there are questions that are out of the domain of science. 
One should always ask: what is the scientific, or at least the rational, justification for believing that 
science will be able to explain everything? There appears to be none. In their arguments in favor of 
science and against religion or theology, some contemporary scientists often recur, explicitly or 
implicitly, to the concept of a “god of the gaps”. This concept was presented by Lucretius in the first 
century A.D., and has become very popular among atheist and agnostic scientists: as humans are 
able to explain natural phenomena that were formerly attributed to “the gods”, those gods no longer 
have a job (McGrew et al., 2009, p. 14). Another way to put it is that the concept of “god” is useful to 
explain the inexplicable, but because science is explaining more and more, soon the “god did it” 
explanation would be no longer necessary. There is an automatic, non-warranted extrapolation of this 
argument to the non-observable world, to the supernatural. This type of reasoning fails to 
acknowledge that because science decides to limit itself to naturalistic concepts, or to the purely 
mechanistic or materialistic, it becomes necessary to accept that it will not be competent to handle 
most questions on values, morality, religion, philosophy, and other areas. According to Ratzsch (2000), 
most philosophers of science accept these limits, but some of them don't, and in many cases the 
motivation has an anti-religious flavor. Claiming that the God of Christianity is a god of the gaps is 
certainly stepping out of science's boundaries, even if the claim has an unfortunate historical basis. 
Science is, therefore, limited in its scope because there is rational knowledge which is not 
scientific. Another perspective on this issue is the type of questions that need to be answered. Science 
asks and attempts to answer a wide range of questions but, as briefly mentioned above, it simply 
cannot answer the ultimate questions, such as: Why do we exist? How did everything begin? Do 
humans possess freedom? It has been proposed that those questions are irrelevant, but then, why do 
they keep coming up? As van Woudenberg states, “all the while two facts remain: first, ultimate 
questions continue to seem meaningful to us as well as of utter importance, and second, science 
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doesn't have a handle on them” (2008, p. 17). 
Not only can science not answer the ultimate questions, but it cannot answer questions about 
the brute facts either. This refers to ultimate or final explanations based on universal laws, which do 
not explain why those laws apply and not others. One example of this category of brute facts is the 
gravitational constant: we know how to apply it and it is extremely helpful when calculating human 
movement or space travel, but science cannot explain what gravity is. Brute facts constitute a limit 
of natural science (van Woudenberg, 2008). 
Another broad category of limits of science has already been hinted at twice, but will now be 
described in slightly more detail: the existence of presuppositions of science. Science cannot exist, 
it cannot be practiced unless some basic presuppositions, which cannot be arrived at scientifically, are 
in place. Precisely because this has been a discussion topic among philosophers of science, I invited 
Dr. René van Woudenberg to share his perspective with our journal (available in this issue in both 
English and Spanish). Interested readers may find a more profound, more detailed presentation of the 
topic in that manuscript.  
Perhaps the best example is the uniformity principle (that because A and B procedures under C 
and D circumstances have resulted in S innumerable times, it will continue to be so), which cannot be 
proven by any means available to humans; this was originally called the problem of induction, by 
David Hume. The extreme weaknesses of this presupposition are well captured by Dell Ratzsch: “So 
uniformity makes no predictions, is untestable, is not at empirical risk, can be bent to accommodate 
anything, is preferentially protected and rests ultimately upon philosophical considerations. Yet the 
uniformity principle is not only legitimately scientific, it is utterly essential to science.” (Ratzsch, 2000, 
Methodological Naturalism, Par. 10.). Apparently, other disciplines tend to be judged more rigorously... 
Another key presupposition is that we can rely on our cognitive abilities such as perception, reason, 
and memory. But in order to test their reliability, we need to first trust them, what William Alston has 
called epistemic circularity (van Woudenberg, 2008, p. 13). It is then not possible to scientifically 
support the reliability of those human cognitive abilities essential for the scientific endeavour. 
The last category of limits I would like to address has to do with the norms of theory choice. 
There is a wide variety of norms to assist in choosing between two or more competing theories, but no 
agreement on their relative importance or even on which should be included. Science itself cannot 
tell us how to choose among theories without resorting to philosophy and all kinds of extra-scientific 
convictions and beliefs. Some examples of norms for theory choice are presented in the next section 
on good science, a particularly relevant topic for scientific journal editors, as it sheds light on the 
decision to accept or reject manuscripts for publication. 
Accepting that the limits do exist, I would like to briefly present how they should be managed. 
There are at least two fronts. To begin with, scientists must reflect on their discipline and honestly 
seek to either respect its boundaries, or complement it with the tools, principles and experts from other 
disciplines. Then, to the extent that individuals fail to respect the limits, be it because of radically 
different perspectives about science or because of the natural tendency to carelessly push one's 
claims and convictions as far as one is allowed, it will fall on the shoulders of the scientific community 
to exercise its refereeing responsibility, the same way that journal editors and reviewers referee the 
quality of publications. There are many examples of scientists and philosophers who, without an 
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element of censorship sometimes present in scientific journals, are playing a very important role in the 
management of the limits of science by keeping these issues on the table and contributing their well-
supported arguments to the discussion. 
  
What is good science? 
The three desirable characteristics of science or of its theories, as stated by Ratzsch (2000), are 
objectivity, rationality and empiricality. These have already been mentioned, but not defined. Well-
known philosophers of science have devoted countless pages to the clarification of these terms; for 
our current purposes, and not without realizing the risk of oversimplification, rationality will be the 
expectation of order, that the world is regular, uniform, and shows patterns that are understandable to 
the scientist. Empiricality has to do with the observability of facts, that is, the possibility of verification 
by measurement or experimentation. Finally, objectivity means that the interpretation of those facts or 
measurements should not vary widely from scientist to scientist. 
Certainly, these characteristics cannot be taken for granted, since there are all kinds of threats to 
each one of them. There are, however, many ways to foster them. In that sense, it should be possible 
to distinguish poor science from stronger science. After all, scientists need to know how to do better 
science, journal editors must be able to weed out weaker communication pieces of science, funding 
agencies should base their decisions on scientific quality besides policy, and even the educated public 
needs to be able to recognize stronger science. Therefore, while a checklist of sufficient and 
necessary requirements cannot be prepared, some guidelines, organized here in table form, should 
help distinguish stronger from weaker science. They are classified as relating to the quality of a theory, 
or the quality of specific experiments or pieces of evidence (in Stephen Wykstra's terms, cited by van 
Woudenberg (2008), theoretical and methodological). Within each category, an attempt has been 
made to present them in ascending order of sophistication, where more sophisticated qualities tend 
not to be as widely accepted. The table also attempts to identify whether each quality would naturally 
reinforce objectivity, rationality, or empiricality. 
It must be pointed out that these are not empirical factors as defined by conventionalists and 
pragmatists. They are more in the line of some of Kuhn's values in science: empirical accuracy, 
consistency, breadth of scope, simplicity, and fruitfulness (Ratzsch, 2000, Rationality, par. 8), or in the 
line of generally accepted desiderata for theories: empirical adequacy, simplicity, good fit with other 
theories, giving rise to unexpected discoveries, fruitfulness, observational nesting, track record, 
smoothness, internal consistency, and compatibility with well-grounded metaphysical beliefs (Ratzsch, 
2000, Confirmation, paragraph 17). They are related to Artigas’ five criteria for assessing theories in 
normal scientific research: explanatory power, predictive power, accuracy of explanations and 
predictions, convergence of varied and independent proofs, and mutual support.  
In the context of the Theory of Scientific Rationality, Van Woudenberg (2008) calls them norms 
for theory choice. As explained in the last limit of science presented in the previous section, there is 
less than clear agreement on these norms and, when forced to choose between two apparently 
equivalent theories, scientists don't have absolute or definitive scientific criteria for making the choice, 
attaching different weight or importance to each of the qualities presented below, to the extreme of 
discarding some of them. 
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Table 1  
Guidelines for the assessment of science quality according to theoretical aspects 
Quality or characteristic Stronger science Weaker science 
01 Simplicity 
Rationality (we consider it 
simple because it can be 
understood by the human mind) 
A simpler theory that accounts for all 
observed phenomena is typically 
preferred to a complex one. 
A theory that becomes 
complicated in order to 
accommodate a few 
discrepancies in the evidence. 
02 Association and 
succession 
 
Rationality 
When two or more phenomena occur 
together (conjunction or contigüity). 
Considered a basic first step, but never 
sufficient to establish causality. The case 
becomes a bit stronger if the 
phenomena always occur in the same 
order (succession). 
The association has only been 
observed once or a few times. 
03 Freedom from 
impossibilities 
 
Rationality 
Not a strong quality by itself. When the description of some 
phenomenon is free from 
impossibilites (proposed by 
Aristotle in Meteorology, as 
presented by McMullin, 2013, p. 
153). 
04 Coherence or consistency 
 
Rationality and Empiricality 
All of many available observations 
(Buridan's apparentia) are in harmony 
with the explanation. 
Significantly stronger if several 
unsuccessful attempts have been made 
at falsifying the theory or explanation.  
Chalmers calls this the process of 
testing the claims against the evidence. 
Only a few observations are 
available, even though they are 
consistent with the explanation.  
OR one or more available 
observations are not consistent 
with the explanation, but are 
qualified ad hoc to achieve 
consistency.  
Instead of testing the claims 
against the evidence, the former 
are accommodated to the latter. 
05 Falsifiability 
 
Empiricality and objectivity 
Related with the previous one. The 
theory or hypothesis should be highly at 
risk of being falsified. Recognizes the 
fallibility of science. 
A theory without informative 
content, which then cannot be 
falsified. 
06 Predictive ability 
 
Rationality and Empiricality 
The theory is able to predict new, 
unknown or even unexpected results 
(McMullin, 2013, p. 180; Medawar, 1985, 
p. 4). 
Predictions or explanations have a high 
degree of accuracy. 
Predictions are conservative, 
highly unlikely to fail. 
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Quality or characteristic Stronger science Weaker science 
07 Alternative explanations 
 
Empiricality, rationality 
There are several alternative 
explanations but the proposed one 
shows reasonably good evidence and is 
coherent 
The only strength of the 
proposed theory is the 
insufficiency of all alternative 
explanations 
08 Scope of application 
 
Objectivity and rationality 
A broader scope is preferred to an 
extremely limited scope 
Two problematic extremes are 
possible. First, an extremely 
limited scope. But second, a 
scope that is too broad: applica-
tion extends beyond warranted 
limits (unwarranted extrapola-
tion) or as Mayo's partitioning of 
theories puts it, the theories gen-
eralize to a greater degree than 
is warranted by the evidence. 
09 Fruitfulness in guiding 
new research 
 
Empiricality 
A theory may be judged stronger to a 
rival if it points more clearly to new areas 
of research, if it fosters progress. 
The theory or a particular 
experiment is sterile, reaches a 
dead end. 
10 Verification of the rules of 
correspondence 
 
Rationality 
Confirmation of the rules of 
correspondence is not possible, but a 
very good approximation is, when 
distinct correspondence rules connected 
with the same theoretical matters are 
available, or when existing theories in 
entirely different areas can be linked 
theoretically (Ratzsch, 2000). 
There is convergence of varied and 
independent proofs: when different 
phenomena that can be tested 
independently can be explained and 
predicted by the same theory (Artigas, 
2001, p. 200). 
No independent confirmation of 
the rules of correspondence can 
even be attempted. 
11 Consistency with extra-
scientific knowledge  
 
Rationality 
Theories are consistent with generally-
accepted, extra-scientific knowledge. 
Theories are compatible with well-
grounded metaphysical beliefs (Ratzsch, 
2000, referring to Newton-Smith's 
Rationality of Science, 1981). 
Theories are in conflict with 
generally accepted, extra-
scientific knowledge. 
  
  
 
Vol.15 N° 1(15-26), ISSN 1659-4436, closing on June 30, 2017 
                                                                                                                                                                                  Editorial 
 
 
- 24 - 
 
This work is licensed under a  
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. 
 
 
Table 2 
Guidelines for the assessment of science quality according to methodological aspects 
Quality or characteristic Stronger science Weaker science 
01 The phenomenon under 
study is observable 
(quantifiable, measurable) 
and verifiable 
 
Empiricality and objectivity 
The claim may be subjected to 
empirical scrutiny, it is “observable” 
(quantifiable) by different methods and 
different people. 
The claim is only observable by 
a particular instrument and the 
instrument's functionality is 
based on a theory associated 
with the phenomenon under 
study. 
02 Range and variety of 
evidence. Coincidence 
(Chalmers, 2013) 
 
All three 
A wide range of phenomena, as 
described by qualitatively different 
genuine tests, coincide in supporting 
the theory (Chalmers, 2013, chapter 
17) 
The tests supporting the theory 
are very limited in type or 
number. 
03 Good inductive process 
 
Rationality and empiricality 
Not only follows appropriate inductive 
procedures, but attempts to exclude 
other relevant causal factors and tests 
the invariability of any purported 
correlation, as recommended by 
Francis Bacon. 
Limited to following appropriate 
inductive procedures. 
04 Reproducibility 
 
Objectivity and empiricality 
The reproduction of an experiment by 
other researchers is highly desirable 
and generally considered a necessary 
characteristic of science.  
Strict reproducibility may not be 
possible. Even if possible, 
funding agencies will often 
reject an experiment unless it 
adds a new perspective; the 
results from new experiments 
may need to be argued into 
being a reproduction of prior 
results.  
05 Quality of the experiment 
 
Rationality 
Results from experiments that were 
adequately performed but in addition 
are relevant and significant (cf. 
Chalmers, 2013). 
Experimental results that are 
adequately performed but may 
not be relevant because they 
add nothing to the state of the 
art. 
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Quality or characteristic Stronger science Weaker science 
06 Handling of unique or 
atypical results 
 
Objectivity and empiricality 
In a study reporting atypical results, 
greater care is necessary: experimental 
design should be strong and results 
should be later reproduced by a 
separate group. 
Any necessary auxiliaries are subjected 
to tests independently of the theory that 
is being argued for (Chalmers, 2013, ch. 
17). 
The authors provide references or 
examples supporting or testing the 
auxiliaries independently. 
Atypical results turn out not to be 
reproducible or are likely to arise 
from a weak methodology. 
 
 
Auxiliaries are introduced but not 
tested independently. Rather, 
they simply accommodate the 
theory to the evidence. 
07 Compliance with accepted 
criteria in the context of 
specific disciplines 
 
Rationality, objectivity 
In addition to all the qualities listed 
above, which apply to all natural 
sciences, there are those currently-
accepted, discipline-specific criteria. The 
methods used in research comply with 
specific criteria preferred by the scientific 
community in that specific field, e.g., in 
exercise science, studies with humans 
are double-blind. 
If methods do not comply with 
the commonly accepted ones, 
and the experiment or theory is 
not strong in other aspects. 
 
 
 To summarize, in this editorial I have briefly discussed three main ideas which are relevant to 
scientific work. First, I explained that the popular concept of science is often too simplistic, almost 
childish, as it does not take into consideration major discussions among philosophers who have taken 
this topic seriously. I specifically proposed that there is no clear definition that will allow honest, 
thinking humans to distinguish between science and non-science; that there is no consensus on the 
scientific method, as a clearly defined series of steps taking us from the initial questions to theory 
development; that there is no possible way for science to claim that truth has been arrived at (although 
I believe that truth exists), no way to absolutely prove anything; that the scientific endeavor is 
impossible without starting from non-scientific presuppositions. Second, I have proposed that science 
has limits which scientists must know and respect if we want to be intellectually honest. And last, I 
submitted that although there is no consensus among scientists to establish a frontier between 
science and non-science, there are indeed theoretical and methodological criteria or qualities that 
enable us to tell stronger science apart from weaker science. 
Special thanks to Peter Distelzweig, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, Dept. of Philosophy, the 
University of St. Thomas, St. Paul, Minnesota, for his patient guidance with this manuscript. Research 
for this editorial was made possible by a one-semester sabbatical leave from the University of Costa 
Rica in 2015. 
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